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Abstract
Background: Hospitals and physicians lie at the heart of our health care delivery system. In general, physicians provide medical care
and hospitals the resources to deliver health care. In the past two decades many countries have adopted reforms in which provider financial
risk bearing is increased. By making providers financially accountable for the delivered care integrated care delivery is stimulated.
Purpose: To assess the evidence base supporting the relationship between provider financial risk bearing and physician–hospital integra-
tion and to identify the different types of methods used to measure physician–hospital integration to evaluate the functional value of these
integrative models.
Results: Nine studies met the inclusion criteria. The evidence base is mixed and inconclusive. Our methodological analysis of previous
research shows that previous studies have largely focused on the formal structures of physician–hospital arrangements as an indicator of
physician–hospital integration.
Conclusion: The link between provider financial risk bearing and physician–hospital integration can at this time be supported merely on
the basis of theoretical insights of agency theory rather than empirical research. Physician–hospital integration measurement has concen-
trated on the prevalence of contracting vehicles that enables joint bargaining in a managed care environment but without realizing integra-
tion and cooperation between hospital and physicians. Therefore, we argue that these studies fail to shed light on the impact of risk shifting
on the hospital–physician relationship accurately.
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Introduction
In many countries, integrated health care delivery plays an increasingly important role in current health care reform
[1]. Hospitals and physicians lie at the heart of our health care delivery system. Both have been working together for
years in providing secondary health services to the community. While physicians provide and coordinate the care,
the hospital provides the resources in which that care can be managed and delivered [2]. Consequently, it has
been argued that the relationship between the medical specialist and the hospital has an influence on the quality
of provided care and cost-effectiveness of health care delivery [3]. Currently, many western countries are seeking
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ways to increase provider accountability by installing provider financial risk bearing for the delivered care [4]. These
efforts reflect stakeholders’ expectations of improving performance in response to two important evolutions. On the
one hand, there is recognition that health care systems are fragmented and suffer from unexplained variability and
gaps in quality of care [5]. On the other hand, rising health care expenditures are a global phenomenon. This trend
is likely to increase further, following the recession that became widespread since 2009 [6]. The confluence of these
forces makes it unlikely that hospitals or physicians will be able to meet these challenges without increased colla-
boration and closer integration [7]. It is important that in this view, physician–hospital integration is not seen as an
end in itself but rather as a means for improving cost-effective performance of secondary care and as a precondition
for the creation of added value for the patient and society. The aim of this paper is to provide insight into the relation-
ship between provider accountability and physician–hospital integration and assess the evidence base. We applied
the principles of agency theory and developed a conceptual framework to increase our understanding of this relation-
ship. We continue with a systematic review of the literature and a discussion of the methods used to measure the
concept of physician–hospital integration.
Theory and methods
Theoretical framework
To increase our understanding of the hospital–physician relationship we build on agency theory. The concepts of
agency theory have been found highly applicable in discussing health care [8,9]. The agency dilemma is present
when one party delegates work to another, who performs the work. The ‘principal’ invokes an ‘agent’ with specia-
lized skills or knowledge to perform the task in question. An agency problem occurs when the agent does not
have exactly the same objectives or motivations as the principal and does not necessarily act in the best interest
of the principal [10].
As depicted in Figure 1, secondary care is characterized by several interdependent agency relationships. First, the
fiduciary relationship between the medical doctor and the patient lies at the heart of secondary care. In this relation-
ship physicians use their competence in the individual patient's best interest [11]. Second, health insurers act as
agent for the patients or population as a prudent buyer of care on behalf of the consumers. Following Boadway
and colleagues [12], we make abstraction from these two relationships (patient–physician and patient–payer) by
assuming that they are passive to the risk distribution problem occurring in the hospital–physician relationship.
Finally, a two-tier hierarchy of principal-agent interactions in hospital care delivery can be identified [8]. The top
one involves the payer as principal to the hospital and physician; the second one involves the hospital as principal
to the medical staff. A dual split in payment is made in which physicians and hospital have their own distinct
Figure 1. An agency perspective of the hospital–physician relationship
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compensation scheme. In this setting, physicians act as independent care givers generating medical fees and other
operating expenses are covered by a hospital budget.
In this study, we concentrate on these three important relationships. More precisely, the payment framework with the
associated financial incentives is used as an instrument to attain the goal of physician–hospital integration. Specifically,
we argue that within the agency framework three important processes can be identified: (a) risk shifting from payer
to providers, (b) risk pooling within physician groups and (c) integration between the hospital and the medical staff.
Risk shifting towards providers
Integrated health care delivery plays an increasingly important role in current health care reform efforts [13]. More-
over, many countries have adopted reforms in which providers are made financially accountable for the delivered
care. This process has been referred to as ‘risk shifting’ towards providers [2]. As new payment methods have
emerged, the nature of the underlying parameters changed, resulting in a varying financial risk allocation between
payer and providers. Traditionally, physicians were paid on a fee-for-service basis and hospitals were reimbursed
for the costs incurred [14]. As such, the financial risk associated with secondary care delivery was retained at the
payer level. However, this situation has changed in recent decades. More specifically, payment systems have
evolved from a retrospective, cost-reimbursement to prospective financing systems, making providers partly accoun-
table for their expenditures. In these prospective payment systems, the provider's payment rates or budgets are no
longer directly linked with the individual costs or efforts of the provider, introducing a certain financial risk at the
provider level [15]. In addition, recognition that the health care system suffers from gaps in quality and safety has
stimulated a broad array of initiatives to improve performance by fostering greater accountability from the part of
providers and the development of value-based purchasing [16].
Risk pooling in physician groups
Physicians usually operate as quasi-independent professional agents in a physician group setting. These structures
that foster shoulder-to-shoulder practice function as financial intermediaries between the payer and the individual phy-
sician [17]. In this setting, two tiers of financial incentives bear on physician behaviour: the method of payment by the
payer and the method used by the medical group to compensate individual physicians. As the individual physicians are
sometimes paid on a different basis than the group, a risk adjustment can be made at the individual practitioner level.
For instance, while the reimbursement system of physicians could rely on capitation (with a fixed fee per capita), these
financial means can be pooled at the physician group level (pooling the fees of all the physicians belonging to that phy-
sician group) and an alternative remuneration system for the individual physicians can be applied (e.g. a fee per patient
visit instead of a fee per patient). While in this exemplary case the physician group is reimbursed by capitation, the indi-
vidual physicians are compensated (and incented) by an alternative compensation system. This intermediate structure
thereby changes the financial risk bearing of the individual physicians. Thus, risk assumption may operate at different
levels in organizational settings, the first via a group effect and the latter at the individual physician level.
Physician–hospital integration
Since the initiation of prospective payment, hospitals have been struggling to develop strategies that improve their
prospects for long-run financial viability. Given physician autonomy, the most important one has been the effort to
build effective hospital–physician relations [18]. This effort has been described as physician–hospital integration.
Previous research has identified three types of integrative actions [19]. Although these types were initially concep-
tualized in the context of physician linkages to health plans, it has been demonstrated empirically that the categories
of integrative actions apply also to the hospital setting [20,21]. First, physician–system integration is the extent to
which physicians are economically linked to a system, use its facilities and services and participate actively in its
planning, management and governance. Second, functional integration is defined as the extent to which key support
functions and activities are coordinated across operating units to add the greatest overall value to the system. Third,
clinical integration encompasses hospitals’ structures and systems to coordinate patient services across people,
functions, activities and sites over time [22]. Common examples of clinical integration are clinical pathways or inter-
disciplinary electronic patient records. Based on the findings of these researchers and drawing on academic and
consulting literature, Burns and Muller [20] proposed an alternative, improved classification of hospitals’ efforts to
align their medical staff. Besides clinical integration, these researchers make a distinction between economic inte-
gration, referring to the contractual, monetary relationship between both and noneconomic integration, emphasizing
the cooperative nature needed in their day-to-day relationship.
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Search strategy
Electronic databases (Medline, CINAHL, Web of Science, EconLit and EBSCO) were searched in June 2013 for stu-
dies focusing on the relationship between provider financial risk bearing and physician–hospital integration by the
development of key search terms. The final search pattern was: [(Salaries and Fringe Benefits OR Reimbursement
OR Incentive OR Fees and Charges OR pay* OR incentive* OR compensation* OR reimbursement* OR financ* OR
bonus* OR remunerat*) AND (hospital AND physician) AND (integration OR relation* OR alignment)]. In addition,
reference lists of all included papers were further examined and additional articles were retrieved. We restricted
the studies eligible for inclusion to those published in peer-reviewed journals in English between January 1989
and June 2013. This time frame was selected because in this period new organizational arrangements with tighter
affiliation between physicians and hospitals were initiated in the USA [23]. In the same period health care policy
debate in European countries also concentrated on the pros and cons of introducing some form of ‘managed com-
petition’ or ‘internal markets’ to enhance efficiency of health care delivery and to contain costs [24]. A first selection
was made on title and abstract. All key articles that were potentially useful to this review were identified. Afterwards,
each article was fully read and judged on relevance. Finally the articles were narrowed down according to the inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria stipulated that citations should be: a peer-reviewed English journal,
across USA or Europe and be conceptual, quantitative or qualitative. The exclusion criteria stipulated that citations
cannot be: industry extracts or scholarly publications focusing the relation between hospitals and primary care phy-
sicians. Abstracts of relevant citations were read and classified in two categories (directly relevant and not relevant).
Only the relevant citations explicitly focusing on the link between provider financial risk bearing and physician–
hospital integration were included for the review. In total, 3064 studies were identified (204 duplicates) and ultimately
9 studies which explicitly focused on the relationship between provider accountability and physician–hospital integra-
tion were included in this review. Figure 2 provides a schematic overview.
Results
We identified nine scientific papers that fulfilled the selection criteria. They are presented in Table 1. Our systematic
review indicates that previous research has largely focused on describing the formal structures of different physi-
cian–hospital organizational arrangements and assessing their prevalence in the advent of managed care. Although
it has been demonstrated that the most these organizations occurred in markets where managed care grew rapidly
[24], only one empirical study was able to demonstrate that managed care is a driving force towards integration [25].
The other studies conclude that the explanatory power is weak [26].
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Figure 2. Flow diagram
This article is published in a peer reviewed section of the International Journal of Integrated Care 4
International Journal of Integrated Care – Volume 15, 31 March – URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-114815 – http://www.ijic.org/
Table 1. Studies included in the systematic review
Empirical
study Sample Data Integration Risk Analyses Main findings
Morissey
et al. [27]
1495 hospitals Data are drawn from
two sources: the
Prospective Payment
Assessment
Commission
(ProPAC) Survey of
hospital–physician
relationships and the
American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey of Hospitals.
Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Stratified random
design
Intermediate
organizational forms are
relatively rare. These
arrangements are
mostly contracting
vehicles with little
organizational
infrastructure.
Participation in a
physician organizational
arrangement is
associated with the
proportion of hospital
revenue obtained from
managed care sources.
There is some evidence
of a threshold at 15% of
patient care revenue.
Burns
et al. [28]
Missing American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey and HAHA
special survey of
integrated delivery
systems
Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Tukey–Kramer tests No relationship could be
identified. If there is a
relation this may be a
discontinuous rather
than a continuous
relationship between
both. The integration
may be related to the
configuration of
managed care activity in
a market.
Dynan
et al. [29]
665 A survey on
physician–hospital
organizational
arrangements
performed by the
American Hospital
Association
Processual
integration
Managed
care
Dimensions of
integration were
derived by factor
analysis and
multivariate
analyses to assess
how integration
differed across
organizational
model by factor-
based scores.
The effect of managed
care penetration on
physician–hospital
integrative processes is
not universal but specific
to a subset of processes.
More specific managed
care penetration is
associated with
economic integration,
physician involvement in
capital budgeting and
ambulatory activities.
Morrisey
et al. [30]
591 hospitals Data come from the
hospital–physician
relationship survey
conducted for the
prospective payment
assessment
commission.
Processual
integration and
organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Regression
analyses
Physician involvement in
hospital management
and governance
increased with managed
care involvement. To a
lesser degree, the use of
physician organizational
arrangements and other
joint ventures also
increased. Practice
management and
support services were
lower in hospitals with
high managed care
activity.
Continues
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Table 1. (Continued)
Empirical
study Sample Data Integration Risk Analyses Main findings
Bazzoli
et al. [31]
665 hospitals An in-depth survey of
hospitals performed
by the American
Hospital Association
combined with
InterStudy HMO
enrolment measures.
Functional
integration,
physician–
system
integration and
clinical
integration
Capitation Two-stage least-
squares
specification tests
and multivariate
analyses
Provider capitation was
found to promote
integration between
hospitals and physicians
in relation to
administrative/practice
management, physician
financial risk sharing,
joint ventures to create
new services, computer
linkages, and an overall
measure of physician–
hospital integration. No
effect evident of
integration and
capitation on hospital
costs.
Burns
et al. [32]
9047 physician–
hospital
organizations
InterStudy HMO
Census and the
Annual Survey
conducted by the
American Hospital
Association
Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Regression
analyses
Alliance formation is
shaped by the number of
HMOs in the market
rather than by HMO
penetration. This
appears to pose a
countervailing
bargaining force of
providers.
Wang
et al. [26]
363 hospitals Four sources of data
were used: the
American Hospital
Association Annual
Survey of Hospitals;
the Health Care
Financing
Administration data
file; the area resource
file and the California
Hospital Annual
Disclosure Report.
Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Linear structure
equation modelling
The empirical results
suggest that managed
care is a driving force
towards forward (e.g.
outpatient facilities &
ambulatory care
centers) and backward
integration (e.g. and
nursing homes and sub-
acute care facilities that
shelter patients after
discharge).
Esposto [21] 759 hospitals Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care case mix
Binary-choice
probabilistic model
The greater the potential
risk of a hospital
becoming the victim of
physician opportunistic
behavior the greater the
probability of it entering
into some form of
contractual integration.
Cuellar and
Gertler [25]
1066 physician–
hospital
organizations
The American
Hospital Association's
Annual Survey of
Hospitals, hospital-
level annual financial
data collected by the
state agencies and
patient-level annual
hospital discharge
data were the three
major sources of data.
Organizational
arrangements
Managed
care
Estimation of a
Cobb Douglas cost
function with
hospital-specific
fixed effects.
The empirical evidence
demonstrates that
hospital physician
integration occurred in
markets where managed
care grew rapidly.
Physician–hospital
integration is a strategic
response to counter the
rising monopsony power
of managed care.
This article is published in a peer reviewed section of the International Journal of Integrated Care 6
International Journal of Integrated Care – Volume 15, 31 March – URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-114815 – http://www.ijic.org/
Our review shows that a methodological critique of the literature is highly needed. Moreover, previous studies have
used different and inadequate measurements of both physician–hospital integration as well as provider financial risk
bearing. This stresses the need of a methodological critique which remained absent in the literature.
Discussion
Physician–hospital integration
Previous studies have focused predominantly on the intermediary organizational models between physicians and
hospitals. While these structures could be a step to increased collaboration, it can be argued that simply creating
structures does not guarantee achievement of true integration. More precisely, the literature has largely focused
on describing the formal structures of different physician–hospital organizational arrangements as an indicator of
physician–hospital integration [22–24]. Table 2 provides an overview of these formal arrangements.
Although data on the contractual relations between physicians and hospitals are readily available and therefore rela-
tively easy to capture, we have some concern regarding the true measurement of integration. While the intermediary
organizational models are a step to increased collaboration, it can be argued that simply creating structures does not
guarantee achievement of true integration. More specifically, the danger exists of creating a contracting vehicle with
the sole purpose of joint bargaining in a managed care environment without realizing true cooperation and integra-
tion [22]. Physician–hospital integration is clearly more than just strengthening the economic ties between both.
Instead, from a policy perspective, added value is realized by increasing the underlying day-to-day cooperation in
order to improve efficient care delivery and to improve the quality of the delivered care. This is congruent with the
fact that only limited differences in the degree of underlying integrative processes across the different organizational
models can be identified [25]. Given these difficulties concerning the measurement of true integration by means of
contractual arrangements between physicians and hospitals, the alternative approach of concentrating on the under-
lying processes of integration (the increased cooperation that leads to added value) is a promising line of research.
In addition, since health policy reform focuses on gradually introducing additional incentives tied to outcomes of
care (i.e. pay for performance), it would be valuable to study the impact on the clinical dimension of physician–
hospital integration.
Provider financial risk bearing
Our theoretical framework has shown that the economic relationships between the payer, hospital and physician(s)
are highly complex. However, most studies have measured provider financial risk bearing solely by the advent of
managed care [22,26]. In this umbrella concept a variety of payment arrangements are used including not only capi-
tation but also discounted fee-for-service or case-based payments. Future research should therefore focus on the
financial risk installed at the provider level by the underlying payment mechanisms. In addition, our results show
that previous studies have measured provider risk bearing in a fragmented way. Consequently, these studies fail
to shed light on the impact of risk shifting on the hospital–physician relationship accurately. First, because of the
Table 2. Definitions of physician–organizations arrangements
Independent Practice Association (IPA): An IP is a legal entity that holds managed care contracts and then contracts with physicians. Usually in
solo practice, to provide care either on a fee-for-service or capitated basis. The purpose of an IPA is to assist physicians who practice solo in
obtaining managed care contracts.
Physician–Hospital Organization (PHO): A PHO is a joint venture between a hospital and physicians. The hospitals acts as an agent for physicians
in managed care contract. The PHO can also own or operate an ambulatory care clinic or ancillary care facility.
Management Service Organization (MOS): A MSO is a hospital department or an organization owned by a hospital and/or physicians that contract
with solo and group practice physicians to provide administrative services.
Medical foundation (MF): A MF is a hospital subsidiary or affiliate that acquires all the physical assets of medical group practice. Physicians are
organized into a separate entity and sing a professional services agreement with the subsidiary corporation.
Integrated Salary Model (ISM): An ISM is a hospital that employs physicians in specialties other than radiology, anesthesiology, pathology or
emergency medicine to provide medical services.
Dynan et al. (1998).
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dual split in payment and physician autonomy in medical decision-making, the degree of risk assumed by the hos-
pital also depends on the alignment of incentives with the medical staff [21]. More specifically in the situations in
which the hospital bears a certain degree of financial risk (e.g. per case payment) and the medical staff's financial
responsibility for their actions remains obsolete or limited (e.g. fee-for-service) the hospital's risk can be considerably
increased. Therefore, besides the financial risk induced by the payment scheme, the degree of alignment between
the separate revenue streams of the hospital and the medical staff should be included. Second, the financial relation-
ships between physicians (risk pooling) and physicians with their hospital (risk sharing) should be considered. More
precisely this instals the possibility to share the risk induced by the payment framework between providers. The eco-
nomic relationships between providers can be used as an instrument to realize this risk sharing. Two possibilities
exist. On the one hand the contractual relationship between physicians and the hospital they practice at can be
used as an instrument to align incentives and share risk between medical staff and hospital [20]. On the other
hand, the physician group level can function as the financial intermediary between the payer and the individual
physician resulting in risk pooling between physicians [33].
Finally, current health policy reform concentrates on the introduction of incentives tied to quality of the delivered care.
It is therefore surprising that up to now no empirical research studies have studied the impact on physician–hospital
integration. Moreover, since most countries have introduced this payment mechanism in a progressive way (by gra-
dually increasing the scope of the programme and the size of payments) this encompasses a promising opportunity
to study this in a longitudinal way.
Limitations
Although payment reform has been identified as one of the main driver to new hospital–physician relationships, we
note that besides provider financial risk bearing also other market forces which were not included in our study could
be potentially important to physician–hospital integration.
First, the recognition that the health care system suffers from serious gaps in quality (e.g. medical errors, unneces-
sary differences in practice patterns and unintended variation in outcomes) has stimulated a broad array of public-
and private-sector initiatives to improve performance [34]. More precisely, accreditation and public reporting of hos-
pital quality have become the locus of have emerged as advocated strategies [35] and as a result, physician–hospital
integration is stimulated.
Second, the level of competition has been identified as one of the other main forces that impact hospitals [36]. More-
over care that has historically been delivered in a hospital inpatient setting can increasingly be performed in a short-
stay or even ambulatory setting. Consequently, beside the traditional full-service general hospital, specialized facil-
ities owned by physicians have emerged as alternative settings of care delivery [37]. This could have a negative
impact on physician–hospital integration.
Conclusion
This paper addressed the study of provider financial risk bearing as a driving force towards physician–hospital inte-
gration. The previous sections have shown that increasing the accountability for the provided care theoretically
enhances physician–hospital integration. Ultimately, this integration is considered to be a precondition for the crea-
tion of added value for the patient and cost-effective care delivery. Our findings, however, can at this time be sup-
ported merely on the basis of the theoretical insights of agency theory rather than empirical research. More
precisely agency theory proposes that a greater degree of financial risk bearing instal a greater degree of interdepen-
dency and thereby induces a greater need for physician–hospital integration. However, this theoretical insight is not
adequately supported by empirical evidence. Two methodological issues contribute to this result of our systematic
review. First, previous research has measured provider risk bearing in a fragmented way. Second, physician–hospi-
tal integration measurement has concentrated on the prevalence of contracting vehicles that enables joint bargaining
in a managed care environment but without realizing integration and cooperation between hospital and physicians.
Therefore, we argue that these studies fail to shed light on the impact of risk shifting on the hospital–physician
relationship accurately. However, we opened up a point of departure for studying the role of provider financial risk
bearing in physician–hospital integration in greater depth. From this starting point, additional research needs to be
executed.
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